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Of Scandals, Sources and Secrets:  
Investigative Reporting, National Post 
and Globe and Mail 
Jamie Cameron* 
Everything you add to the truth subtracts from the truth. 
— Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Novelist – Nobel laureate  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Twice in recent years, vital information from confidential sources 
enabled investigative reporters to expose scandal at the highest reaches 
of federal politics in Canada. Starting in 1999, the National Post (“the 
Post”) began a series of reports on “Shawinigate” under Andrew 
McIntosh’s byline.1 Then The Globe and Mail (“the Globe”) took the 
lead in detailing the Quebec sponsorship scandal through reports by 
Daniel Leblanc, who also published a book titled MaChouette.2 Address-
ing different events, at different times and places, the two journalists 
uncovered evidence of questionable transactions, ethical violations, 
conflicts of interest, misappropriation and wrongdoing at the intersection 
                                                                                                             
*  Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. This is the first of three articles for a newsgather-
ing project I have undertaken as scholar-in-residence for the Law Commission of Ontario (January-
June 2011). I owe great thanks to Faye Ling, J.D./M.B.A. 2013, for her research assistance on this 
article, and also to Holden Sumner, J.D. 2013. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Benjamin 
L. Berger and Simon Kupi, J.D. 2011, for perceptive comments on an earlier draft. Finally, it should 
be noted that I acted for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (“CCLA”) in R. v. National Post, 
[2010] S.C.J. No. 16 (S.C.C.) (with John McCamus and Matthew Milne-Smith) and also in Globe 
and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] S.C.J. No. 41 (S.C.C.) (with Chris Bredt and Cara 
Zwibel). 
1  See online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/2010/05/07/the-shawinigate-affair-a-timeline/>; 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/chretien/beaudoin.html> (providing timelines for the key events 
in the Shawinigate story and ex-BDBC president François Beaudoin’s lawsuit against the bank). 
2  See Nom de Code: MaChouette: L’enquête sur le scandale des commandites (Montreal: 
Libre Expression, 2006). 
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of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Liberal Party and business interests in 
Quebec. Shawinigate and the sponsorship scandal rocked the nation, 
undermined public confidence in the integrity of government, and led to 
reforms, a judicial inquiry and criminal prosecutions.3 In this way, 
watershed events in Canadian politics created a rare chance for the 
Supreme Court of Canada to consider newsgathering, investigative 
reporting and the status of confidential sources under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.4  
McIntosh and Leblanc both relied on information from unknown 
sources who stepped forward in the public interest, and at personal risk. 
In the course of his work on Shawinigate, McIntosh gained access to 
sources in the Business Development Bank of Canada (“BDBC”), as 
well as in former Prime Minister Chrétien’s home riding of St-Maurice. 
Meanwhile, the foundation for Leblanc’s reporting was a single source, 
“ma chouette” (“MaChouette”), who at the time of the sponsorship 
program was a federal government employee. Both men promised to 
protect the identity of individuals who would not have provided sensitive 
information without that guarantee.  
Investigative reporting depends on relationships of trust with sources 
who agree to reveal information under a pledge of confidentiality. 
Individuals who expose the affairs of others are vulnerable, perhaps no 
more so than when revelations take the form of whistle-blowing.5 
Though most act in the public interest, some seek a platform to conduct a 
vendetta, plant false or misleading information, or advance interests that 
                                                                                                             
3  Most notably, the sponsorship scandal led to the Commission of Inquiry into the Spon-
sorship Program and Advertising Activities [hereinafter “the Gomery Commission”], which was 
established in early 2004 and reported in two stages, in late 2005 and early 2006. See Who is 
Responsible? – Phase 1 Report (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2005); 
Restoring Accountability – Phase 2 Report (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, 2006).  
4  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].  
5  A whistle-blower is an individual who believes that a wrong or harm has been committed 
— in government, business, or other institutions — and who discloses the matter to authorities 
internally, or to outside agencies, including the media. Canada’s statute law, provincial as well as 
federal, fails to give whistle-blowers adequate protection from reprisal and repercussions. See Amy 
Minsky, “Whistleblower protection laws are broken” Postmedia News (February 24, 2011), online: 
<http://fairwhistleblower.ca/news_digest/2011/02>. See also the Public Servants Disclosure 
Protection Act, S.C. 2005, c. 46 (encouraging federal public sector employees to come forward 
where wrongdoing has occurred, and providing protection from reprisal against them, as well as a 
process to deal with those against whom allegations have been made). 
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are less than noble.6 Whatever a source’s motive may be, it is difficult to 
assess the reliability of information that is shrouded in secrecy, and that 
is where ethics play a central role. The unavoidable paradox is that 
journalists cannot tell some secrets without promising to keep others, and 
pursue objectives of transparency and accountability in their reporting, 
despite being neither transparent nor accountable for their own sources. 
From the outside looking in, investigative reporting provides the best that 
journalism has to offer, but only if it meets the standards of the profes-
sion. These are the underlying dynamics at play when the law is asked to 
decide whether to protect a journalist’s promise of confidentiality or 
order the disclosure of confidential information that is sought — and 
needed — in legal proceedings.  
The common law protects confidential relationships through the con-
cept of privilege. This protection can take the form of a testimonial 
immunity that allows some secrets to be kept hidden, despite their 
relevance in criminal or civil proceedings.7 In principle, immunity can be 
granted when the public interest in protecting a confidential relationship 
is strong enough to rebut the presumption that relevant evidence is 
compellable.8 Because it is a form of special treatment, or exceptional-
ism, access to a privilege or testimonial immunity is carefully guarded. 
Not only is truth-seeking the justice system’s unconditional goal, the 
courts must be careful, in advancing that objective, not to shield certain 
relationships from scrutiny or otherwise treat them as favourites of the 
law. The principle that the law is entitled to “every man’s evidence” has 
                                                                                                             
6  Questionable examples include O’Neill v. Canada (Attorney General), [2006] O.J. No. 
4189, 213 C.C.C. (3d) 389 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “O’Neill”], where a government source leaked 
false and damaging information about Maher Arar; and In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 
964 (D.C. Circ. 2005), cer. denied, 125 S.Ct. 2977 (2005) [hereinafter “Miller”], where White House 
sources leaked the identity of Central Intelligence Agency agent Valerie Plame, ostensibly because 
her husband challenged President Bush’s claim that Iraq was developing weapons of mass 
destruction; the investigation led to journalist Judith Miller’s decision to spend 85 days in jail to 
protect her source. 
7  Documents can also be privileged and though National Post concerned a leaked bank 
document, the purpose of the privilege was to protect the document’s source, and not to prevent its 
content from being disclosed. Analysis in all the courts proceeded under the common law Wigmore 
standard, which provides a four-part test for determining the availability of a privilege.  
8  See generally c. 13, “The Law of Privilege” in C. Hill, D. Tanovich & L. Strezos, eds., 
McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence, 4th ed. (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2005) 
[hereinafter “McWilliams, ‘The Law of Privilege’”].  
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presumptive force, and that makes it difficult to dislodge the general rule 
in favour of an exception.9  
Against that understanding of privilege, R. v. National Post10 and 
Globe and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General)11 invited the Court to 
recognize confidential newsgathering sources under section 2(b) of the 
Charter. Key differences between the cases deepened the challenge, but 
also enriched the opportunity for critical reflection on an issue the Court 
had not squarely addressed before.12 In National Post, the RCMP 
obtained coercive orders against McIntosh and the newspaper to search 
for an envelope and internal bank document that were the centrepiece in 
a forgery investigation. The question there was whether documents sent 
to the reporter by an unknown source were protected by a privilege. 
Globe and Mail arose from a federal government lawsuit to recover 
moneys that were misspent in the Quebec sponsorship program. Groupe 
Polygone wanted to question government employees to find out when the 
federal government discovered that the sponsorship program had gone 
awry, and determine whether the claim was time-barred.13 During cross-
examination on a motion brought by the Globe, Leblanc refused to 
answer questions that could compromise MaChouette’s identity.  
How the Court responded to journalist-source confidentiality in these 
cases was immensely important. Narrowly, the question was whether the 
identity of confidential sources would be protected under the prevailing 
common law, Wigmore test for privilege.14 At the same time, the drama 
of Shawinigate and the sponsorship program could not be ignored; in 
                                                                                                             
9  The famous quote is from Wigmore: “For more than three centuries it has now been 
recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has 
a right to every man’s evidence.” 8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed. (John T. McNaughton Rev., 1961), 
at s. 2192. 
10  [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “National Post”]. See  
S. Kupi, “Charter-ing a Course: National Post, Journalist-Source Privilege and the Future of 
Canada’s Charter Press Clause” (2010) 69 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 2 (forthcoming, 2011).  
11  [2010] S.C.J. No. 41, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 592 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Globe and Mail”]. See 
C. Leblanc, Marc-André Nadon & Emilie Forgues-Bundock, “The Journalist-Source Privilege in 
Quebec Civil Law: Globe and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General)” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. 
(2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 273. 
12  But see Moysa v. Alberta (Labour Relations Board), [1989] S.C.J. No. 54, [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 1572 (S.C.C.) (raising a claim which was dismissed by the Court without discussion of the 
Charter status of confidential sources). Important lower court decisions include St. Elizabeth Home 
Society v. Hamilton (City), [2008] O.J. No. 983, 2008 ONCA 182 (Ont. C.A.); Re Charkaoui, [2008] 
F.C.J. No. 52, 2008 FC 61 (F.C.); and O’Neill, supra, note 6. 
13  Infra, notes 148 and 149 (explaining the proceedings and the way Leblanc became in-
volved in a lawsuit between the federal government and Groupe Polygone).  
14  Infra, note 59 (setting out the elements of the test). 
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both instances, Canadians learned from the media how public officials 
had betrayed the public trust. From that perspective, the more urgent 
question of principle was whether the Court would recognize confiden-
tial newsgathering sources under section 2(b) of the Charter. For that to 
happen a sensibility of newsgathering and the role it plays in democratic 
governance was needed. The difficulty was that the pre-Charter Wigmore 
standard was not grounded in any theory of press function, and the 
Court’s section 2(b) jurisprudence did not provide a strong foundation for 
a constitutional approach to this issue.15 Unwilling to bridge the distance 
between a common law and constitutional conception of privilege, the 
judges rejected a Charter model and re-affirmed the status quo, common 
law test.  
McIntosh’s investigative reporting did not make a good impression, 
and the Court upheld the orders against him and the Post.16 Though the 
judges assumed that the bank document was a forgery, rather than a leak, 
either way the reporter’s source should have been protected. By focusing 
on the suspicious circumstances surrounding the document, the Court 
overlooked the richer narrative of Shawinigate. Doing so caused the 
judges to discount the section 2(b) value of McIntosh’s investigative 
reporting, and led to a balancing of interests that impermissibly favoured 
law enforcement interests. Not only did this compromise the Shawinigate 
story, it placed a wider chill on investigative reporting.  
That is why the Court’s decision in National Post should be placed in 
perspective. Specifically, it should be read down and restricted in 
application to cases where a reporter is in possession of the “physical 
instrumentality” or actus reus of a criminal offence. The Court was 
deliberate and emphatic that National Post was more about real evidence 
than confidential sources, and Globe and Mail corroborated that view a 
few months later.17 There, and on different facts, the judges adopted a 
more source-protective approach and suggested criteria to determine the 
question of privilege. That is why Globe and Mail, not National Post, 
                                                                                                             
15  But see Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 
S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.) (recognizing the democratic role of newsgathering and 
its s. 2(b) status, in an open court setting). 
16  Justice Abella agreed with Binnie J.’s discussion of the law but dissented, alone, from the 
conclusion that the envelope and document were not privileged in these circumstances; she would 
have recognized the privilege, and quashed the search warrant and assistance order.  
17  National Post, supra, note 10, at paras. 2, 3, 62 and 65 (emphasizing that this was “not 
the usual case of journalists seeking to avoid testifying about their secret sources” but was instead a 
physical evidence case); id., at para. 3.  
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sets the standard and should be considered the Court’s leading precedent 
on confidential newsgathering sources.  
Going forward, sources can be protected by giving National Post a 
narrow scope and interpreting Globe and Mail generously. That said, the 
decisions represent a lost opportunity — after being invited to re-frame 
newsgathering and recognize its connection to core democratic values 
under the Charter, the Court sought refuge in the status quo. Technology 
has fundamentally altered the status quo and, in a world where “we’re all 
journalists now”, rendered prior conceptions of the press all but mean-
ingless.18 It has never been less clear who is a member of the press, 
whether for purposes of a privilege or otherwise. While a narrow view of 
journalism and newsgathering is underinclusive and would exclude 
bloggers, citizen journalists, and others who use non-traditional media, a 
generous definition would be overinclusive to the point of collapsing 
section 2(b)’s press and media guarantee into freedom of expression. 
If technological change has now made it possible for any and all to 
“gather” news, it has also transformed the ways and means of informa-
tion exchange. Transparency and accountability may be core values, but 
whether they can or should be pursued in any way, and at any cost, is 
another matter. One dynamic that poses serious issues is the rise of 
anonymity in the way information is obtained and proliferated on a no-
name basis. Today, leaks are as commonplace as they are shocking, and 
anonymity has become ever more the chameleon — the indispensable 
condition of free debate and the free exchange of views in some settings, 
and an invitation to mischief in others. Anonymity and confidentiality are 
not the same and must be distinguished. Still, the paradox is that activity 
that promotes section 2(b)’s core values of transparency and accountabil-
ity has opened up worrying questions about the transparency and 
accountability of the information itself. 
The common law is versatile enough to serve as an engine of change 
or stand firm as the last bastion of yesterday’s thinking. In this instance, 
the Court provided some protection for journalists and their confidential 
sources, but only within the confines of a common law conception that 
never anticipated the changes that would be wrought by technology and 
the arrival of constitutional rights. In the absence of judicial leadership, 
                                                                                                             
18  See S. Gant, We’re All Journalists Now: The Transformation of the Press and Reshaping 
of the Law in the Internet Age (New York: Free Press, 2007). 
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the policy questions raised by National Post and Globe and Mail must be 
taken up in an alternative forum.  
II. SHAWINIGATE, NATIONAL POST AND “X” 
1. Forgery or Leak? 
In comparison to the Quebec sponsorship scandal, which led to a 
judicial inquiry, prosecutions and innumerable consequences, “Shawini-
gate” lost momentum shortly after an internal bank document was 
leaked. Despite leading to important reforms, Shawinigate fell short of its 
investigative potential. Today, Andrew McIntosh’s exposé of Jean 
Chrétien’s dealings with St-Maurice businesses and businessmen might 
seem less like an instance of pioneering journalism and more like a 
cautionary tale. In this tale, an ambitious reporter misplaced his confi-
dence in a mischievous source who either forged a document, or ac-
cepted a forged document in order to frame a sitting Prime Minister.19 It 
is a shallow view — a view that obscures the critical narrative of 
Shawinigate and McIntosh’s role in exposing a system of political 
favouritism in the prime minister’s riding. Yet that is essentially the 
account the Supreme Court accepted in National Post. 
On April 5, 2001, Andrew McIntosh received an envelope and 
document anonymously in the mail. By then, the Post reporter had been 
working for over two years on a series of stories about the flow of federal 
moneys to businesses and individuals in Prime Minister Chrétien’s 
riding.20 Initially and throughout, his investigation centred on the tangled 
web surrounding the prime minister’s ownership interest in the Grand-
Mère Auberge and Golf Club, including the role he played in the BDBC 
                                                                                                             
19  According to the Court, this case was about an attempt to “dupe” the National Post into 
publishing an “allegedly forged document”; National Post, supra, note 10, at para. 4. 
20  Affidavit of Andrew McIntosh, at paras. 63-90 [hereinafter “McIntosh Affidavit”], Ap-
pellants’ Record, Volume 4 (electronic file available from author) (describing how his research and 
fact-finding began late in 1998, and led to publication of his first stories about the Auberge and the 
Prime Minister, in January 1999; id., at para. 89). See Andrew McIntosh, “Into the Rough: In 1988, 
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien bought into a golf course. Now it’s a financial handicap and no one’s 
talking”, National Post (January 23, 1999), at B1; Andrew McIntosh, “Businessman who bought 
hotel from Chrétien given federal aid; $665,000 awarded to Quebecker with criminal record” 
National Post (January 25, 1999), at A1. 
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loan.21 Not only did McIntosh discover that Mr. Chrétien had an interest 
in the property, he also learned that the sale of that interest was not 
consummated when he became prime minister in 1993.22 Though  
Mr. Chrétien’s compliance with parliamentary rules on disclosure was 
one issue, the matter acquired added significance when the Auberge 
received a BDBC loan for $615,000 in 1997.  
Two years later, when McIntosh reported his findings and the Oppo-
sition began to ask questions, Mr. Chrétien told the House of Commons 
that his relationship with the Auberge was over; likewise, he maintained 
that he had had no personal interest in the property when the business 
received more than $1 million from the government, including grants as 
well as the principal loan.23 Faced nonetheless with ongoing demands for 
clarification and proof of these claims, the prime minister finally an-
nounced that he had been paid for his share of the business, but not until 
October of 1999.24 The same year, Andrew McIntosh earned Story of the 
Year honours from the Canadian Association of Journalists for his 
investigative reporting on the prime minister’s relationship with the 
Auberge and its access to federal funding.25 
In addition to exploring the circumstances surrounding the prime 
minister’s ownership interest, the reporter developed a network of 
contacts and sources who shared information about other irregularities 
around federal grants, loans and awards to businesses in the St-Maurice 
riding.26 At the same time, McIntosh probed deeper into the circum-
stances surrounding the Grand-Mère’s surprising success in obtaining a 
                                                                                                             
21  In 1988 Jean Chrétien acquired an ownership interest in the Grand-Mère Golf Club, 
which included the assets, goodwill and ongoing business of the Grand-Mère Inn [hereinafter 
“Auberge”], but not the building. In 1994 the building was sold to Yvon Duhaime, the Grand-Mère’s 
owner and principal in this time period. McIntosh Affidavit, id., at paras. 67-76. 
22  Id., at paras. 87-89. 
23  Id., at para. 109. The BDBC rejected the first application for $2 million, before approving 
a loan for a smaller amount of $615,000. In addition to the BDBC loan, McIntosh reports that the 
Auberge received $50,000 from a federal government regional development group, id., at para. 77; 
job creation grants for $188,799, id., at para. 93; and $161,000 from an HRDC Transitional Jobs 
Fund grant, id., at para. 103. 
24  Id., at paras. 120-121 (describing pressure on the prime minister to table an agreement 
which would prove that the shares had been sold), and para. 133 (providing the prime minister’s 
verbal confirmation, in the House of Commons, that the shares had been sold).  
25  Id., at para. 147. 
26  Id., see paras. 63-153 (providing a detailed narrative of the details around various grants, 
awards and contracts in the Prime Minister’s riding). 
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BDBC loan.27 In chasing these stories, McIntosh made contact with  
and relied on confidential sources from the BDBC, as well as from  
St-Maurice. He approached one such source in 1999 and was told, at the 
time, that “X” would not share information with him “on any basis”.28 
The following year X had a change of heart and approached McIntosh; 
even so, X would only correspond through the agency of an intermedi-
ary, “Y”.29 The information obtained from X through this go-between 
arrangement enabled the reporter to verify what he had been told by 
other sources: that the prime minister played an active role in securing 
the Grand-Mère’s loan.30  
After 12 months of journalistic investigation, McIntosh broke the 
news that Mr. Chrétien had made repeated calls urging bank president 
François Beaudoin to approve the loan.31 Over Mr. Chrétien’s earlier 
denials of involvement32 the Post headline proclaimed, “Prime Minister 
Lobbied for Disputed Loan”.33 That is how Canadians learned, in the 
middle of a federal election campaign, that their prime minister had used 
his office to help the Auberge get a loan which, in addition to being a 
questionable business risk, did not comply with internal bank procedure. 
To make matters worse, five RCMP investigations into the awarding of 
federal government contracts in Shawinigan were underway, the Grand-
Mère was in default on its loan from the BDBC, and various liens were 
                                                                                                             
27  Id., at para. 84 (explaining McIntosh’s curiosity about how “a federal bank made such a 
large loan to a man with a criminal record and a history of failing to pay his income taxes and failing 
to meeting [sic] his other financial obligations”). Not only were internal procedures not followed, 
McIntosh uncovered troubling details about owner Yvon Duhaime’s sketchy past; see id., at paras. 
80-82 (discussing Duhaime’s criminal record, which was not disclosed to the bank, and status as the 
prime suspect in an arson at another hotel he owned prior to the Auberge), and para. 230 (describing 
some of the procedural irregularities and ways in which Duhaime received preferential treatment). 
28  Id., at para. 154. Though it is unknown whether X is a “he” or “she”, the source is re-
ferred to as “he” in this article. 
29  Id., at paras. 155-156. 
30  Id., at paras. 158-159 (specifying what X gave him and how that enabled McIntosh to 
confirm the prime minister’s calls to the bank). 
31  This history is detailed in the affidavit, id., at para. 95 (explaining that Confidential 
Source #1 was the first to tell him that the prime minister has “talked and even joked about having to 
make many phone calls to get Mr. Duhaime his loans and grants”); paras. 110-111 (describing the 
information volunteered by “Confidential Source #3”); para. 160 (explaining that McIntosh 
corroborated the information from three independent confidential sources); and paras. 158-161 
(detailing the documents received from X on this issue). 
32  McIntosh Affidavit, id., at para. 90 (stating that the prime minister’s Office denied any 
involvement in awards, grants and loans to the Auberge).  
33  Id., at para. 162. See Andrew McIntosh, “PM lobbied for disputed loan” National Post 
(November 16, 2000), at A1. 
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registered against the property by governments and creditors.34 Mr. 
Chrétien had little choice in the circumstances but to admit that he had 
called Beaudoin about the loan. Still, he insisted that there was nothing 
improper or unusual about that, because “[y]ou call who you know … 
It’s the normal operation.”35  
Though the Liberals won the election in fall 2000, the controversy 
did not abate. When Parliament reconvened in 2001, the Opposition 
peppered the prime minister and his government about Mr. Chrétien’s 
calls to the bank, and complained about the placement of Liberal Party 
operatives in key bank positions.36 The brouhaha led the Ethics Coun-
selor to recommend that the conflict of interest code be tightened to 
prevent the prime minister or members of Cabinet from lobbying the 
heads of Crown corporations.37 Shortly before the leaked document 
arrived at the Post, McIntosh discovered that the corporate records for 
the Auberge continued to list the prime minister’s holding company, JAC 
Consultants, as the registered owner of 25 per cent of the business.38  
Those were the stakes on April 5, 2001, when the reporter received a 
copy of an internal BDBC document in the mail that showed JAC 
Consultants as a creditor of the Auberge. It was dynamite because it 
appeared to confirm that the troubled inn owed him money at the time 
Mr. Chrétien urged the bank president to approve the loan. When the 
reporter and newspaper took steps to authenticate the document, the 
prime minister’s office, the lawyer for the Chrétiens, and the BDBC 
claimed in unison that the document had been forged.39 Specifically, they 
alleged that it had been altered to add the name of JAC Consultants as a 
creditor. Though the Post decided not to run the story, other newspaper 
                                                                                                             
34  R. v. National Post, [2004] O.J. No. 178, 69 O.R. (3d) 427, at para. 7 (Ont. S.C.J.) [herei-
nafter “National Post – warrant review”] (citing para. 157 of the McIntosh Affidavit, id.). 
35  McIntosh Affidavit, id. 
36  Id., at paras. 170-181. See Andrew McIntosh, “Tobin defends PM against loan queries: 
Grand-Mère Inn: Accuses Tories of engaging in ‘character assassination’” National Post (February 
1, 2000), at A6; Robert Fife & Andrew McIntosh, “PM trying to silence me: Clark: Boudria denies 
threats: Tories allege Liberals vowed to cut caucus funding if questions on loans persisted” National 
Post (February 2, 2001), at A1. 
37  Andrew McIntosh, “Wilson targets cabinet’s lobbying: Fall-out from Grand-Mère: Ethics 
boss would bar PM, ministers from pressuring Crown corporations” National Post (February 9, 
2001), at A1. 
38  McIntosh Affidavit, supra, note 20, at paras. 182-196 (describing the pressure on the 
prime minister in the winter and spring of 2001). See Andrew McIntosh, “PM kept stake in club: 
sources: Sold in ’93 PMO insists: ‘I was trying to clear him. Now, I can’t’, says Chrétien friend” 
National Post (March 23, 2001), at A1.  
39  McIntosh Affidavit, id., at paras. 198-215 (describing those steps). 
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and media organizations gained access to the document and published 
the details.40 
The amount in question was not significant, but that did not matter so 
much.41 If the document was forged, it meant that someone had altered 
an internal bank form to frame the prime minister. And if the document 
was authentic, it meant that when Mr. Chrétien contacted BDBC’s 
president he was also protecting his interest as one of the business’s 
creditors.  
Shortly after April 5, McIntosh learned that the document had been 
sent to him by X, his key source on the prime minister’s role in the 
BDBC loan.42 When the two met, X explained that he received the bank 
document anonymously, did not know where it had come from, and had 
simply passed it on.43 The reporter refused to destroy the document and 
envelope but promised to protect X’s identity, though only after taking 
steps to test X’s integrity and ensure that he was not being misled.44 
McIntosh also told his source that he would keep the promise, unless he 
discovered that X had used him at which point, the reporter indicated, he 
would no longer regard his pledge of confidentiality as binding.45 
Within days it became clear how much was at stake. Amid claims of 
partisanship on the part of the judge who heard the ex parte motion, the 
bank obtained an order to search Beaudoin’s residence.46 Far from being 
a coincidence, the ex-president’s acrimonious relationship with the 
BDBC is an integral part of the back story. In 1999, Beaudoin left his 
position at the bank and then sued for wrongful dismissal. He claimed 
that he had been fired when he tried to recall the loan from the Auberge, 
and insisted that he had been the victim of political interference.47 His 
                                                                                                             
40  Id., at para. 220. 
41  According to the leaked document, the Auberge owed JAC Consultants $23,040. Nation-
al Post, supra, note 10, at para. 12. 
42  See McIntosh Affidavit, supra, note 20, at paras. 221-227 for an account of this meeting. 
43  National Post, supra, note 10, at paras. 16-18; McIntosh Affidavit, id., at para. 229. 
44  McIntosh Affidavit, id., at para. 226 (explaining that X’s request did not surprise him as 
he is often asked to destroy documents and other materials to protect the identity of the source). Id., 
at paras. 228-229 (explaining the steps McIntosh took to authenticate the document). 
45  National Post, supra, note 10, at para. 17 (the “modified” undertaking of confidentiality); 
McIntosh Affidavit, id., at para. 228. 
46  Campbell Clark & Daniel Leblanc, “Quebec judge in conflict, Alliance leader says” The 
Globe and Mail (April 10, 2001), at A1; Elizabeth Thompson, “Writ allowed raid on home of former 
BDC president; ex-partner in law firm that represented Grand-Mère golf course” The Ottawa Citizen 
(April 10, 2001), at A1. 
47  McIntosh Affidavit, supra, note 20, at para. 153. See Andrew McIntosh & Robert Fife, 
“Grand-Mère Inn at heart of dismissal lawsuit: Prime Minister denies involvement” National Post 
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premises were searched because this history pointed to him as the prime 
suspect for leaking the document to the press. When police failed to 
unearth the missing document, attention turned to a criminal investiga-
tion and orders against McIntosh and the National Post.48 Though others 
were in circulation, the RCMP focused on McIntosh’s copy because his 
document was the only one that had been handled by the source, and 
DNA testing could reveal that person’s identity. The intrigue deepened 
once the press became part of the investigation, and comparisons 
between the bank’s “true” copy and the alleged forgery raised key 
questions: was the document a forgery or a leak, and was the unknown 
source guilty of a criminal offence or was he simply a whistle-blower? 
Although the threshold to obtain a search warrant is not high, 
whether and how different standards should apply to orders against the 
press was at the heart of National Post.49 The theory of the investigation 
was that the internal bank document had been altered to add JAC 
Consultants as a creditor of the Auberge, and then leaked to McIntosh. 
That theory was challenged by the reporter and newspaper, who pointed 
to deficiencies in the RCMP materials that made it difficult to determine 
which document was authentic.50 Irregularities and gaps in the evidence 
led the reviewing judge to remark that “[a] serious question was raised 
about the integrity of the Bank’s files.”51 Though Benotto J. thought it 
inappropriate to substitute her views for those of the ex parte warrant 
judge, she quashed the search warrant and production orders. 
                                                                                                             
(November 15, 2000), at A1. Beaudoin went to trial and won the lawsuit in 2004 before settling his 
claim with the BDBC. 
48  Id. 
49  A search warrant can be obtained, under s. 487(1) of the Criminal Code, when there are 
reasonable grounds for authorities to believe that evidence relating to the commission of an offence 
will be found; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 487. In Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421, at 444 (S.C.C.) the Court held that “among 
commercial premises, the media are entitled to particularly careful consideration” and added that 
“[t]he media are entitled to this special consideration because of the importance of their role in a 
democratic society”. 
50  McIntosh Affidavit, supra, note 20, at para. 231 (raising the issue of “possible file tam-
pering within the BDC”), paras. 256-266 (explaining that the apparent signature of “Yvon Duhaime” 
was not the man’s signature), and paras. 267-281 (detailing a range of other defects and deficiencies 
in the RCMP investigation). 
51  National Post – warrant review, supra, note 34, at para. 22. See also para. 21 (noting that 
the name “Yvon Duhaime” was handwritten as a signature though the RCMP later revealed that it 
was not a signature after all, but “a note mistakenly made by a Bank employee”), and para. 22 (also 
noting that a key page, which would have confirmed whether or not the document being searched 
was authentic or not, was missing and that although this was not explained to the warrant judge, it 
should have been). 
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After considering this issue, the Ontario Court of Appeal was not 
willing to decide which document was authentic.52 As the decision 
pointed out, the evidence did not show that the BDBC document was not 
authentic, but nor did it establish that the copy in McIntosh’s possession 
was the true, authentic version.53 This stand-off led the court to reverse 
the reviewing judge’s decision and uphold the orders.  
These circumstances made it imperative for the Supreme Court to 
exercise caution before upholding the orders. Yet Binnie J., who wrote 
for the majority, showed little interest in comparing the documents, 
questioning the gaps in the investigation, or engaging the question of 
forgery versus leak. His opinion focused on the document in McIntosh’s 
possession, the meeting between the reporter and his source, and the 
orders at issue. It leaves little doubt that the Court’s decision turned on a 
single, compelling fact: that the purpose of the search was to gain access 
to the physical evidence, the physical instrumentality, the actus reus of 
an offence against the Prime Minister of Canada.54 By a vote of eight to 
one, the judges held that McIntosh’s confidential relationship with X was 
not privileged and upheld the orders against him and the National Post.55  
2. Confidential Sources, the Wigmore Privilege and the Charter  
Though National Post was not the Supreme Court’s first Charter case 
on journalist-source privilege, Moysa v. Alberta offered little or no 
guidance.56 There, the claim was so weak the Court dismissed the appeal 
without committing itself to a view of the privilege, whether at common 
law or under section 2(b) of the Charter.57 Some 20 years later, the Court 
                                                                                                             
52  National Post v. Canada, [2008] O.J. No. 744, 89 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 66 (Ont. C.A.), 
per Laskin, Simmons, and Gillese JJ.A. [hereinafter “National Post – OCA”]. See generally paras. 
59-66 (discussing the “forgery” status of the document leaked to the National Post). 
53  Id., at para. 66 (stating, although the evidence does not establish “conclusively” that the 
document is a forgery, that it meets the reasonable and probable grounds threshold). 
54  National Post, supra, note 10, at para. 3 (stating that “this is a physical evidence case” 
and that “the media claim to immunity from production of the physical evidence is not justified” 
(emphasis added)), and at para. 65 (stating that there is a significant difference between “testimonial 
immunity against compelled disclosure of secret sources and the suppression by the media of 
relevant physical evidence” and that journalists have “no blanket right to suppress physical evidence 
of a crime” (emphasis added)). 
55  Justice Abella agreed with Binnie J.’s discussion of the law of privilege but dissented 
from his conclusion that the document and envelope were not privileged in these circumstances.  
56  Moysa v. Alberta (Labour Relations Board), supra, note 12. 
57  The Wigmore-based privilege was unavailable because no confidence had been sought or 
given; more to the point, perhaps, the case involved a reversal of roles, in which a journalist had 
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had several options to consider in addressing the question of confidential 
newsgathering sources. From a constitutional vantage, the alternatives 
were a Charter model and a Wigmore-Charter hybrid;58 within the 
framework of the common law, the Court could choose between a class 
privilege and Wigmore’s default test for determining privilege on a case-
by-case basis.59 In principle, the key question was whether the common 
law could adequately protect the section 2(b) values at stake. If not, 
Wigmore would have to be abandoned, or modified, to accommodate the 
Charter. 
At common law, a privilege to protect confidential relationships 
takes the form of immunity from testimonial compulsion, and operates as 
an exception to the rule that relevant evidence is compellable in a court 
of law.60 As such, the exception is limited to private or confidential 
relationships that serve vital public interests. In building a doctrinal 
framework around that concept, the common law created a two-tier 
system or hierarchy between “class” and “case-by-case” privileges. The 
result is a double standard which separates relationships that are pre-
sumptively privileged from others that are not. For relationships with 
“class” status, a prima facie privilege attaches once the claimant estab-
lishes her membership in the class. Though class privilege is not abso-
lute, the presumption of confidentiality is not displaced until the party 
seeking access to the evidence demonstrates that there are exceptional 
circumstances that justify a breach of the relationship. Key examples of 
                                                                                                             
supplied, not obtained, information and was trying to avoid disclosing the identity of the person to 
whom she had served as a source; id., at para. 12. Justice Sopinka also found that there was no 
evidence to support a s. 2(b) claim that testimonial compulsion would affect newsgathering or cause 
news sources to “dry up”; id., at para. 21. The Court noted, without comment, that the Alberta 
Labour Relations Board had applied the test from Powell J.’s concurrence in Branzburg v. Hayes, 
which essentially requires that the evidence be crucial to the party seeking it, relevant to the 
proceedings, and not available from any other source. Id., at paras. 8 and 22. See Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (S.C. 1972). 
58  The appellants were joined in the proposal for a Wigmore-Charter hybrid along these 
lines by Bell Globemedia Inc., Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the “Media Coalition”. The 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association [“CCLA”] and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association  
(“BCCLA”) both proposed a Charter approach to the question of privilege.  
59  The Wigmore criteria are as follows: (1) The communications must originate in a confi-
dence that they will not be disclosed; (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full 
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3) The relation must be one which 
in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) The injury that would inure 
to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby 
gained for the correct disposal of litigation. R. v. McClure, [2001] S.C.J. No. 13, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 
445, at para. 29 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “McClure”] (citing Wigmore’s text). 
60  See McWilliams, “The Law of Privilege”, supra, note 8. 
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this top-tier privilege include solicitor-client, police-informant, and 
spousal relationships.61 
Otherwise, the status of confidential relationships is subject to Wig-
more’s four-step test for determining immunity on a case-by-case basis. 
Immunity is more difficult to establish under this model because there is 
a presumption against privilege that is only rebutted when the would-be 
privilege holder meets all parts of the test. A case-by-case or qualified 
privilege succeeds when a court decides that it is more important to 
protect the sanctity of a confidential relationship than to have access to 
relevant or probative evidence. Relationships that can ground a situ-
ational privilege include doctor-patient and priest-penitent, as well as 
treatment relationships and religious communications more generally.62  
After 1982, the validity of a framework based on fundamental differ-
ences between class and case-by-case privileges could no longer be 
assumed.63 Wigmore’s rules were not based on constitutional considera-
tions, and the Charter’s arrival made it imperative for the courts to re-
think the common law hierarchical distinction between the two types of 
privilege. It could be argued, for instance, that the Charter equalized 
Wigmore’s confidential relationships by constitutionalizing all of them 
under section 7’s protection of privacy.64 Still, the common law had 
resisted a monolithic approach to evidentiary privilege, and nor was it 
obvious that all confidential relationships are equal under the Charter: the 
text references some Wigmore relationships, but not others.  
Journalist-source privilege is a case in point. Prior to the Charter, 
immunity for confidential newsgathering sources was subject to the four-
part test for case-by-case privilege. The question that arises under section 
2(b) is whether that standard adequately protects the Charter’s guarantee 
of press and media freedom. Under that provision, the relationship 
between a journalist and her source is not merely confidential in nature, 
but constitutional in scope as well.  
                                                                                                             
61  McClure, supra, note 59, at para. 28 (identifying solicitor-client, spousal, and informer 
relationships as the three main class privileges in Canadian law). 
62  Id., at para. 29 (identifying relationships which might be recognized under Wigmore’s 
case-by-case test). 
63  R. v. Gruenke, [1991] S.C.J. No. 80, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263, at 286 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Gruenke”] (describing the differences between a “blanket”, prima facie or class privilege and case-
by-case privilege).  
64  See e.g., R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Mills”] (discussing the privacy rights of complainants in sexual assault cases). 
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For these reasons the Charter claim was compelling in National Post. 
There, authorities conducting a criminal investigation obtained coercive 
orders against members of the press that violated section 2(b) and 
required justification under section 1. In place of Wigmore’s four-part 
test, the Charter approach that was proposed set a threshold for prima 
facie breach under section 2(b), followed by section 1 review under the 
terms of Dagenais/Mentuck.65 The constitutional model rested on a 
conception of the press that recognizes its vital role in promoting and 
preserving democratic governance. To play this role, the press and media 
must be free from coercive interference from the state, and nowhere is 
this more critical than when investigative reporting obtains compromis-
ing information about public officials through the use of confidential 
sources. In doctrinal terms, a claimant would have to establish her 
entitlement under section 2(b) by showing that information was obtained 
from a source, under a promise of confidentiality that was given in the 
course of newsgathering activity. At that point the burden would shift and 
the party seeking disclosure would have to justify the violation under 
section 1 pursuant to the terms of the Dagenais/Mentuck test.66  
Re-styling Wigmore’s balancing of interests to accommodate the 
Charter’s underlying values and framework of analysis was well within 
the Court’s reach in National Post. Justice Binnie not only rejected this 
approach, but in doing so but dramatized the implications of any Charter-
based solution. He spoke first about the folly of recognizing newsgather-
ing under section 2(b), fretting that a Charter approach would lead to the 
constitutionalization of every technique imaginable, including “cheque-
book journalism”, long-range microphones, telephoto lenses, or “elec-
tronic means to hear and see what is intended to be kept private”.67 
Reading the issue “up” enabled Binnie J. to point to other newsgathering 
                                                                                                             
65  This test prohibits discretionary orders which limit expressive freedom unless “(a) such 
an order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because 
reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (b) the salutary effects of the [order] 
outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the 
right to free expression. …”: Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 (S.C.C.) 
(combining Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”] and R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mentuck”] and applying the test to a closed investigative hearing under the 
Criminal Code’s anti-terror provisions). 
66  That was the CCLA’s proposal in this appeal. The Court’s breakthrough decision in 
Dagenais added that common law standards which do not protect constitutional entitlements must be 
modified to meet the Charter’s requirements. 
67  National Post, supra, note 10, at para. 38. 
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practices — which admittedly can be offensive — in order to marginalize 
the question at stake in National Post. Finding fault with these newsgath-
ering practices had little relevance in a case where an award-winning 
journalist relied on confidential sources while engaged in investigative 
reporting with undeniable links to core section 2(b) values. 
Paradoxically, Grant v. Torstar also supplied an argument against a 
progressive approach to confidential sources.68 In changing the law of 
defamation and introducing the concept of “responsible communication”, 
Grant created a defence that is not limited to journalists but is available 
to anyone who makes defamatory statements on matters of public 
interest.69 This presented a problem in National Post because it sug-
gested, by analogy, that testimonial immunity might be available to 
anyone who claims to be a journalist. From that perspective, privilege 
could encourage the unscrupulous to hide relevant evidence, wreak 
havoc on the privacy of others, and do so with a free pass to engage in 
mischief. This prospect moved Binnie J. to vent that “throwing a consti-
tutional immunity around a heterogenous and ill-defined group of writers 
and speakers” would “blow a giant hole in law enforcement and other 
constitutionally recognized values such as privacy.”70  
There, too, his analysis was not quite on point. The law of defama-
tion applies to individuals and members of the media alike, and Grant 
simply recognized that the Reynolds defence of “responsible journalism” 
should not be available only to the media.71 Unlike Grant’s defence, 
which can be invoked by any defendant who can establish a “public 
interest” in her defamatory statements, the concept of privilege is 
relational. Immunity can only be claimed by a person who obtains or 
receives confidential information in the course of newsgathering activi-
ties, and in direct exchange for a promise of confidentiality. Key differ-
ences between the two meant that Grant’s responsible communication 
defence did not provide principled grounds for rejecting a Charter model 
in National Post. 
                                                                                                             
68  See Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, 2009 SCC 61 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Grant”]. 
69  The defence of “public interest responsible journalism” is based on two key elements: 
statements on a matter of public interest, and compliance with a seven-step standard of “responsible 
communication”. See id. 
70  National Post, supra, note 10, at para. 40. 
71  See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1999] 4 All E.R. 609 (H.L.) (introducing the 
“responsible journalism” defence in defamation litigation). 
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That said, technology has generated difficult questions that challenge 
conventional notions of who the media are and what role they play. It 
was clear that the Court was uneasy in the face of those concerns and, 
rather than assume the risks of change, sought refuge in the status quo. In 
National Post, though, the definitional quagmire-in-waiting had little to 
do with McIntosh or his newspaper, whose media credentials were 
beyond dispute.72 As well, whether privilege is modelled on a common 
law or Charter doctrine, the Court in either case will have to decide who 
is a journalist and entitled, as a result, to claim a privilege. Once again, 
the issue did not provide Charter-specific reasons for rejecting a constitu-
tional approach in this case.  
As an alternative to the Charter, the Court could have accommodated 
section 2(b)’s values by treating the journalist-source relationship as a 
class privilege. Unlike Wigmore’s case-by-case test, this approach 
focuses on the relationship, not its particulars. As noted, the claimant 
must show that she is a member of the class but once that is done, the 
privilege attaches. The details of confidentiality and whether they 
deserve the law’s protection do not matter because the privilege has 
presumptive force. Though the privilege is not absolute and must yield in 
some circumstances, the burden to dislodge it shifts to those who seek 
access to confidential information. Functionally, this privilege bears 
close resemblance to the Charter model which was proposed: both rest 
on a concept of prima facie privilege or its equivalent of entitlement 
under section 2(b), both shift the burden to the party seeking access to 
confidential information, and both set a strict test for any derogation 
from the privilege.  
The unstated equivalence between the two may explain why Binnie 
J. was just as stern in rejecting this option. Here, too, he found the scope 
of the privilege concerning, not only because the class lacks boundaries 
but because it lacks standards as well. After commenting on the variety 
and degrees of professionalism — or lack of it — among journalists, 
Binnie J. concluded that journalists cannot comprise a class because the 
                                                                                                             
72  The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the Crown’s argument that there is no principled 
basis for determining who is a journalist and able to form a confidential source relationship, because 
the case-by-case approach did not require the Court to establish the boundaries of “legitimate 
journalism”. As well, the court stated that it could “hardly be disputed” that a national news 
organization and respected journalist fall into the class of those who can claim journalist-source 
privilege. National Post – OCA, supra, note 52, at para. 99. 
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)  INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING 251 
 
profession lacks licensing or regulatory oversight.73 It also bothered him 
that key details of the relationship, such as the parameters of the promise 
and who the privilege belongs to, are uncertain.74 Here, as well, National 
Post did not call for dispositive answers, as Andrew McIntosh was 
indisputably a journalist who was engaged in investigative reporting, and 
was ad idem with his source about the nature and scope of the promise of 
confidentiality. In combination, the Court’s responses to these issues 
show how apprehensive the judges were about opening the concept of 
privilege up to an indeterminate class of journalists. 
From a conceptual standpoint, a class privilege was attractive be-
cause a focus on the relationship — rather than its particulars — leads to 
a prima facie privilege that carries presumptive force. Though that is its 
merit, the Court also rejected this approach because it is more rigid than 
case-by-case decision-making.75 A class privilege would be more source-
protective, but a claimant seeking immunity would still have to establish 
that she belongs to the protected class. Recognizing a class privilege in 
National Post would not have prevented the Court from developing 
criteria to determine who is a journalist, on a case-by-case basis; as noted 
above, the issue is unavoidable, no matter which approach is taken.  
Eliminating the Charter and class privilege left the Court with two 
options, both of which were tied to the four-part, case-by-case test; one 
was a Wigmore-Charter hybrid and the other, Wigmore simpliciter. In 
concept and design, the hybrid’s aim was to retain the Wigmore test, but 
constitutionalize it by shifting the burden and incorporating the Dagen-
ais/Mentuck test into the fourth step. Under this model, the claimant 
bears the onus on the first three elements of Wigmore before the burden 
shifts to the party seeking disclosure, for the fourth and final element of 
the test.76  
Though it was a resourceful attempt to superimpose a constitutional 
solution on a common law framework, the Court did not seriously 
entertain this option. Justice Binnie questioned the coherence of an 
approach that would bisect the burden of proof and graft constitutional 
criteria onto a common law test. He was especially unwilling to split the 
                                                                                                             
73  National Post, supra, note 10, at para. 43 (adding, also, that nor could such an organiza-
tion be readily envisaged, “given the scope of activity contemplated as journalism in Grant v. 
Torstar”). 
74  Id., at paras. 44-45. 
75  Id., at para. 46. 
76  Id., at para. 60 (describing this proposal). 
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onus between the parties, and made a point of stressing that the burden of 
persuasion to establish a privilege is on the media.77 As he explained, 
“the risk of non-persuasion rests at all four steps on the claimant of the 
privilege”.78 It was also unclear whether the Wigmore-Charter hybrid 
was specific to the journalist-source relationship or might apply to other 
case-by-case privileges. For these reasons, the Court found the proposal 
unsound. 
That left the traditional test. The status quo was attractive because it 
had strong pedigree and did not require doctrinal changes to accommo-
date the Charter. Contextually, it was significant that the Court had 
already considered the Charter and upheld Wigmore’s case-by-case test 
in other settings. In R. v. Gruenke, for instance, the Court decided against 
a class privilege for religious communications and also rejected a prima 
facie privilege under section 2(a) of the Charter.79 The Court addressed 
those questions in Gruenke even though the communications between a 
pastor and lay counsellor and the accused were not confidential and did 
not satisfy the first step of the test.  
In M. (A.) v. Ryan the defendant in civil proceedings sought access to 
documents that were generated during the course of a confidential 
relationship between the plaintiff and her psychiatrist.80 Justice McLach-
lin thought that the common law approach to privilege should be re-
tained, though with modifications that would update the test to reflect 
emerging social realities, including Charter values.81 Though taking 
sections 8 and 15 into account in A.M.’s case pointed to a compelling 
interest against disclosure, she concluded that the “occasional injustice” 
was too high a price to pay for confidentiality. Instead, she settled on a 
“partial privilege” that represented a compromise between protecting the 
treatment relationship and compelling relevant documents to be dis-
closed.82  
                                                                                                             
77  Id. (describing this as a “three steps forward one step backward argument” which was 
unpersuasive because it “presupposes that a privilege arises after the third step and is then subject to 
rebuttal by the opposing party at the fourth step”). 
78  Id., at para. 64. 
79  Supra, note 63. 
80  [1997] S.C.J. No. 13, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ryan”].  
81  Id., at para. 23. 
82  Id., at paras. 32-33 (suggesting that not all documents should be disclosed, that editing 
should be done to remove non-essential material from disclosed documents, and that restrictions 
should be placed on who can see or copy the documents, to “ensure the highest degree of confiden-
tiality and the least damage to the protected relationship, while guarding against the injustice of 
cloaking the truth”). See J. Ross, “Partial Privilege and Full Disclosure in Civil Actions: M. (A.) v. 
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If Gruenke and Ryan made it unlikely that the Court would adopt a 
more favourable approach to journalist-source relations, solicitor-client 
privilege provided a closer analogy. National Post barely mentioned this 
privilege, though the Court has considered solicitor-client relations 
extensively and singled this relationship out for special treatment under 
the Charter. In National Post, Binnie J. noted that “[e]ven solicitor-client 
privilege” is generally seen as a substantive rule of law “rather than as 
‘constitutional’.” 83 The purpose of this remark was to downplay the 
Court’s solicitor-client jurisprudence and make the section 2(b) claim 
seem more radical than it was. In doing so, he drew attention to an 
analogy that should have been considered in National Post, but was not. 
Twice, in R. v. McClure84 and Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada,85 
the Court all but constitutionalized the relationship between a lawyer and 
her client. In McClure, Major J. declared that the solicitor-client relation-
ship is a fundamental legal right that “commands a unique status within 
the legal system”, and “is integral to the workings of the legal system 
itself”.86 His opinion also maintained that the privilege “must be as close 
to absolute as possible”, and indicated that it “will only yield in certain 
clearly defined circumstances”.87 Justice Major accepted that an excep-
tion can arise where core issues about an accused’s guilt are at stake and 
there is a genuine risk of wrongful judgment unless solicitor-client 
communications are disclosed.88 Even so, full answer and defence only 
overrides the privilege where the accused is able to show that the 
information is not available from any other source and that there is no 
other way to raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt.89 
The other key decision is Lavallee,90 which invalidated a Criminal 
Code provision that authorized law office searches. In doing so, Arbour 
J. confirmed that “solicitor-client privilege must remain as close to 
                                                                                                             
Ryan” (1997) Alta. L. Rev. 1067 (commenting on the apparent contradiction between the privacy 
rationale for protecting a privilege and the conclusion that a significant part of the records must be 
disclosed). 
83  National Post, supra, note 10, at para. 39.  
84  Supra, note 59. 
85  [2002] S.C.J. No. 61, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lavallee”]; See Adam 
M. Dodek, “Reconceiving Solicitor-Client Privilege” (2010) 35 Queen’s L.J. 493, at 495, fn 4 
(providing a list of 11 decisions since 1999) [hereinafter “Dodek”]. 
86  McClure, supra, note 59, at paras. 25 and 31.  
87  Id., at para. 35. 
88  Id., at para. 47. 
89  Id., at para. 48. 
90  Lavallee, supra, note 85. 
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absolute as possible if it is to retain relevance”, described it as a principle 
of fundamental justice under section 7,91 and found that a search under 
section 488.1 would violate section 7 as well as section 8 of the Char-
ter.92 Together, McClure and Lavallee established that solicitor-client 
privilege is practically inviolable and, in doing so, effectively treated the 
relationship as a Charter entitlement.93  
It is debatable whether lawyer-client communications deserve such 
singular protection, and the Court has been chastized for granting special 
status reflexively, without studying the basis of privilege or considering 
the complex and diverse nature of lawyer-client relations.94 Of greater 
interest here is an institutional comparison of solicitor-client and journal-
ist-source relations. Specifically, the privilege in McClure rested on the 
proposition that solicitor-client relations are integral to, and at the core 
of, the justice system. Earlier, in Gruenke the Court relied on the institu-
tional role of solicitor-client communications to distinguish that relation-
ship from others that are purely private in nature.95 In like manner, this 
logic applies to journalists and their confidential sources; simply put, that 
relationship is as vital to newsgathering and section 2(b)’s democratic 
values as the solicitor-client relationship is to the integrity of the justice 
system. Albeit in different ways, both relationships support the corner-
stones of our system of government: while solicitor-client relations are 
the foundation of a justice system that is open and accessible to all, the 
journalist-source relationship — while admittedly more exceptional — 
plays a key role in advancing the transparency and accountability of our 
representative institutions. 
Journalists, the press and the media promote and protect the integrity 
of the democratic system. Their role is institutional and structural in 
                                                                                                             
91  Lavallee, id., at para. 24. In this she echoed McClure, supra, note 59, at para. 41 (declar-
ing that “[s]olicitor-client privilege and the right to make full answer and defence are principles of 
fundamental justice”). 
92  Lavallee, id., at para. 35 (stating that an unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 does 
not comply with s. 7’s principles of fundamental justice). 
93  See B. Morgan & M. Jamal, “The Constitutionalization of Solicitor-Client Privilege” in 
P. Monahan, ed. (2002) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 213, at 223 and 227 (claiming that solicitor-client privilege 
“crossed the Rubicon into constitutional territory” in McClure, and passed “another important 
milestone” in Lavallee). 
94  Dodek, supra, note 85. 
95  Gruenke, supra, note 63, at para. 32 (stating that although solicitor-client communica-
tions are prima facie protected because they are “essential to the effective operation of the legal 
system”, religious communications — though of social importance — are not “inextricably linked” 
to the justice system in the same way). 
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nature, and has been recognized by the Supreme Court as well as by 
courts around the world.96 This insight explains why confidential 
newsgathering sources should be recognized and protected by section 
2(b) of the Charter — the democratic function distinguishes confidential 
newsgathering relationships from the confidential communications that 
were considered in Gruenke and M. (A.). Unlike newsgathering relation-
ships, which advance democratic values like transparency and account-
ability, religious and therapeutic relationships serve private, rather than 
public, purposes. Those relationships can give rise to a privilege because 
public policy protects purely private relationships in at least some 
circumstances. By contrast, newsgathering and investigative reporting 
are core functions of section 2(b)’s public purposes, and are vitally linked 
to the guarantee’s democratic values. That is why the relationship 
between a journalist and her source rests on a distinctive rationale that is 
grounded in the Constitution and cannot be equated with others that are 
concerned with privacy.  
The record in National Post offered ample evidence of the role con-
fidential newsgathering sources have played in promoting and protecting 
Canada’s democratic values.97 Despite acknowledging the special 
position of the press and the need for “solid protection” for secret 
sources, the judges rejected the Charter argument and even refused to 
modify the common law.98 The conceit of National Post is that section 
2(b)’s values are not at risk when a privilege is claimed, because the 
Wigmore test incorporates those values in balancing confidentiality 
against disclosure.99 Yet rhetoric is no substitute for structured criteria or 
bright line tests that are designed to protect constitutional entitlements. 
Nor can a balancing of interests that is based on “common sense and 
                                                                                                             
96  National Post, supra, note 10, at paras. 33, 65 and 70 (recognizing the importance of 
confidential sources and their need to be protected from disclosure); see also para. 48 (describing 
statutory protection for confidential sources in other jurisdictions), and para. 66 (discussing U.K. 
case law on this issue). 
97  Id., at para. 28 (providing a list of important stories which were brought to light by inves-
tigative reporting). 
98  Id., at para. 41. See also paras. 30, 31 and 33 (recognizing that “[t]he appellants and their 
experts make a convincing case that unless the media can offer anonymity in situations where 
sources would otherwise dry-up, freedom of expression in debate on matters of public interest would 
be badly compromised” and “[I]mportant stories will be left untold, and the transparency and 
accountability of our public institutions will be lessened to the public detriment”). 
99  Id. (claiming that “the history of journalism in this country shows that the purpose of s. 
2(b) can be fulfilled without implying a constitutional immunity”). 
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good judgment” satisfy the standard of rigour required by the Charter.100 
Of equal concern is Binnie J.’s assertion that the onus “will rarely play a 
pivotal role at the fourth step”.101 To the contrary, the burden of proof can 
be determinative, as here, where the Court held that McIntosh and the 
National Post failed to prove that the protection of confidentiality 
outweighed the production of the envelope and bank document.102 It is 
not so clear that authorities would have been able to justify the violation 
of the confidential relationship under a standard for class privilege or the 
Dagenais/Mentuck test.103 
3.  Wigmore Balancing 
In undertaking the balancing of interests under Wigmore’s fourth 
step, Binnie J. recognized that the criminal investigation could be 
“contrived to silence improperly the secret source”, but rejected that 
possibility in National Post, because “[t]he alleged forgery is distinct 
from whistleblowing.”104 In making that remark he assumed the question 
at issue, which was whether the Crown had sufficiently established a 
bona fide forgery investigation to justify coercive orders against mem-
bers of the press. Moreover, though the threshold is low for search 
warrants, it is accepted that special considerations apply when members 
of the press or media are targeted.105 A press-sensitive approach to the 
orders was a fortiori essential in National Post, where authorities sought 
access to a document implicating the prime minister in unethical con-
duct. The stakes were high, and not as one-sided as the majority opinion 
suggested.  
                                                                                                             
100  Id., at para. 60. 
101  Id. 
102  Id., at para. 91. 
103  One example, among several, is Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) 
(finding in favour of a privilege for the “Drudge Report” because the party seeking access to a 
confidential source did not meet its burden to justify disclosure and therefore disprove the privilege). 
104  National Post, supra, note 10, at para. 62 (citing O’Neill, supra, note 6). The difference, 
in his view, is that “[i]n terms of getting out the truth, the ‘leak’ of a forged document undermines 
rather than advances achievement of the purposes of the privilege claimed by the media in the public 
interest” (emphasis in original). Id. That view presupposes the question in issue, which was whether 
or not the document was a forgery, for if it was not, the leak fell squarely within the purposes of the 
privilege. 
105  Lessard, supra, note 49, at 444 (itemizing nine factors that must be considered before a 
search warrant can be ordered against a member of the press). 
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The probative value of the evidence was a key point in the balancing 
of interests here. If disclosure is compelling when the evidence has 
strong probative value, it follows that confidentiality should be protected 
when the information at stake is of little or no probative value. Paren-
thetically, this is precisely why the onus matters in these cases.106 In this 
instance the record showed that X did not know where the document 
came from or who had sent it, in which case DNA testing might reveal 
X’s identity but would leave the remote source of the document un-
known.107 This did not deter Binnie J., who found little reason to take X’s 
claim of ignorance at face value. As he explained, the police are “not 
required to accept as true the version of events told by X as relayed 
through Mr. McIntosh, who has his own interest in the outcome of this 
litigation”.108  
It is a fair point, as X could have hoped to steer suspicion away from 
himself by pointing to a remote source. Yet X was not the only one who 
had an interest in self-serving claims. By alleging forgery, the prime 
minister became the victim of wrongdoing and was able to deflect 
attention from a scandal that had provoked raucous exchanges in the 
House of Commons, and was still front-page news a few days before the 
leak.109 In addition, the record contained at least some evidence that the 
true purpose of the search was to find the leak, and concerns about the 
integrity of the bank’s documents cast further doubt on the legitimacy of 
the search.110 As Abella J. observed, if the envelope would not expose the 
forgerer, “the only purpose for learning the confidential source’s identity 
is to discover who had created this public and awkward controversy”.111 
In any case, the documents were of questionable probative value be-
cause they had been extensively handled and it was doubtful that they 
                                                                                                             
106  It is the difference between imposing a burden on the evidence-seeking party to establish 
that the information has sufficient probative value to defeat a presumption of confidentiality, and 
requiring the privilege holder to rebut a presumption in favour of disclosure, by showing that the 
evidence does not have sufficient probative value to warrant the breach of a confidential promise. 
107  National Post, supra, note 10, at paras. 135-139 (per Abella J., pointing out that the doc-
uments were marginal, at best, in advancing the forgery investigation).  
108  Id., at para. 75. 
109  Supra, note 38 (“PM kept stake in club”). 
110  McIntosh Affidavit, supra, note 20, at paras. 248-249 (deposing, at para. 248, that the RCMP 
officer stated that “there are confidential documents circulating and my job is to put a stop to it”).  
111  National Post, supra, note 10, at para. 140 (also stating that “[c]uriosity about the identity 
of a confidential source may be understandable, but is never, by itself, an acceptable basis for 
interfering with freedom of the press”). 
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would identify the source.112 Justice Binnie addressed that concern by 
pointing to X’s fear of being discovered, as though it demonstrated guilt 
and improved the probative value of the evidence.113 In fairness to X, 
there is little reason to suppose that X had any idea what DNA testing 
might find, and it is well known that confidential sources live in fear of 
being found, whether or not discovery is likely. A bona fide whistle-
blower would be just as terrified of being discovered as a person who 
forged a document to mislead the public about the prime minister’s 
ethics.  
It is even more remarkable that Binnie J. would have upheld the or-
ders even if the search was “extremely unlikely” to yield the evidence 
being sought.114 Translated, this means that law enforcement prevails 
even when the probative value of the evidence approaches the vanishing 
point. To explain, Binnie J. reasoned that while confidentiality needs no 
protection when a source’s identity will not be disclosed, the interest in 
“correctly disposing” of an investigation is constant and remains high — 
regardless and in spite of the evidence.115 In other words, the relative 
weakness of the evidence does not lower the balance on law enforce-
ment’s side of the scale. Yet there surely is no balancing when one side  
of the equation is fixed to win, and is unmovable in the face of the 
evidence. 
Nor did Binnie J. hesitate to make adverse comments about 
McIntosh’s relationship with X. Though it had little to do with the 
question of probative value, he faulted McIntosh for giving X a “bind-
ing” promise of confidentiality; he unquestionably thought it unwise for 
the reporter to do so without knowing the identity of the source, or 
whether the document had been forged.116 In fairness, the reporter’s 
affidavit had simply explained, from a journalist’s perspective, why the 
                                                                                                             
112  Id., at para. 136 (per Abella J.). 
113  Id., at para. 72 (stating that “even X believed that forensic testing could advance the 
investigation to his or her detriment”); see also National Post – OCA, supra, note 52, at para. 109 
(stating that “[a]t the very least, X’s request [that McIntosh destroy the documents] shows that X 
believed disclosure … would advance the investigation”). 
114  National Post, id., at para. 74 (emphasis added). 
115  Id. 
116  As he explained, “[t]he bottom line is that no journalist can give a source a total assur-
ance of confidentiality”, and “a source who uses anonymity to put information into the public 
domain maliciously may not in the end avoid a measure of accountability.” Id., at para. 69. 
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)  INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING 259 
 
promise was made and how it would be affected were he to discover that 
he had been misled.117  
In commenting on the relationship between McIntosh and his source, 
Binnie J. made it very clear that a journalist cannot give promises that 
have the force of law.118 Though correct in law, his scold missed the point 
of a journalist’s undertaking, which is to build trust and encourage 
sources to release information that is in the public interest. As a matter of 
professional practice, journalists are entitled to make and keep promises 
to their sources; such promises will be honoured unless the journalist is 
ordered, in a legal proceeding, to break that pledge and reveal confiden-
tial information. At that point the journalist must decide whether to 
comply with the order or keep the promise and go to jail.119  
The low probative value of the evidence provided reason enough for 
the Court to quash the orders, but there is more. In “weighing up”, Binnie 
J. indicated that the nature and seriousness of the offence should be 
measured against the value of a promise of confidentiality.120 The Court 
was so concerned about the document as actus reus that the offence, its 
roots in political scandal and the irregularities in the evidence hardly 
mattered at all. The Ontario Court of Appeal had described the forgery as 
“an especially grave and heinous crime”, and accused the reporter and 
newspaper of “shielding a potential wrongdoer from prosecution for a 
serious crime”.121 Justice Binnie went a step further in explaining, by 
way of analogy, how the law would deal with a lawyer who purported to 
claim a privilege after hiding a murder weapon or suppressing tapes of 
violent sexual crimes.122 It was not fair to compare murder weapons and 
violent sex tapes to the alleged forgery in this case, which did not involve 
physical harm, engage safety or security interests, or pose any threat of 
violence. As Abella J. observed, it was fundamentally unhelpful, “[o]n a 
continuum of serious criminality”, to compare “a possible forgery of a 
possible debt” with the Paul Bernardo murder scenario.123  
                                                                                                             
117  Id., at paras. 16-18 (summarizing paras. 221-229 in the McIntosh Affidavit, supra, note 20). 
118  Id., at para. 77 (stating that “[i]t is the courts” … and not individual journalists or media 
outlets, that must ultimately determine whether the public interest requires disclosure”). 
119  See, e.g., Judith Miller, “Why Confidential Sources are Important and Why I Would Go 
to Jail to Protect Them” (Winter 2005) Communications Lawyer, at 8-9. 
120  National Post, supra, note 10, at para. 74. 
121  National Post – OCA, supra, note 52, at paras. 117-118. 
122  National Post, supra, note 10, at para. 65 (citing the example of Ken Murray and the 
Bernardo-Homolka tapes). 
123  Id., at para. 141. 
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On the other side of the balance, the Court paid little attention to the 
“deleterious” consequences of violating a confidential newsgathering 
relationship. The evidence showed that X was skittish from the outset 
and only came forward, after initially refusing to assist, through an 
intermediary. Not only would DNA testing potentially show who sent the 
envelope and bank document, in doing so it would also disclose who 
McIntosh’s source was in reporting on the prime minister’s lobbying 
with the bank. At the very least, the Court should have considered the 
totality of McIntosh’s relationship with X, including the whistle-blowing 
information he provided on Mr. Chrétien’s interference with BDBC 
decision-making.124 In this instance, evidence that had little to offer the 
truth-seeking function seriously compromised a confidential newsgather-
ing source who played an important role in the Shawinigate stories prior 
to the leak. In such circumstances, the balance unquestionably favoured 
confidentiality over disclosure.125  
Also missing from the Court’s consideration of the interest in protect-
ing confidentiality was a broader perspective on the issues at stake. 
Though the bank document surfaced at a critical moment in the Shawini-
gate saga, it constituted one piece, albeit a dramatic one, of a larger story. 
The Court’s focus on the forgery and the imperative to investigate placed 
McIntosh’s use of confidential sources — both before and after the leak — 
at risk. His investigative reporting produced a series of stories that were 
based on information obtained from a variety of sources. The Court’s 
failure to consider the broader context of investigative reporting on 
Shawinigate skewed the analysis by shortchanging the privilege-protecting 
side of the ledger and giving the advantage to law enforcement’s concerns.  
In broader compass, the use of coercive orders to deter investigative 
reporting of a scandal then in progress could only have enormous 
consequences for section 2(b)’s pursuit of transparency and accountabil-
                                                                                                             
124  Despite noting that “the problematic transmission from X must be assessed in light of a 
history of providing information and documents that turned out to be authentic”, Binnie J. either 
overlooked X’s earlier whistle-blower status or did not consider it relevant in determining whether 
the envelope and loan document were privileged. Id., at para. 76. 
125  Id., at para. 74 (stating that even if the envelope is “extremely unlikely” to disclose the 
identity of the source(s), the court would still balance the weak public interest in protecting an 
identity that is not likely to be disclosed against the strong public interest in the production of 
physical evidence of the offence (emphasis added)). See also National Post – OCA, supra, note 52, 
at para. 111 (stating that “[i]f it is a remote and speculative possibility that forensic testing will 
reveal the identity of the person who sent the document, then disclosing the document and envelope 
will not likely negate any confidence”). 
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ity in public affairs. As Benotto J., the reviewing judge, recognized, 
“society as a whole is affected” when the journalist-source relationship is 
undermined, and that is because it is through “confidential sources that 
matters of great public importance are made known”.126 
Finally, the Court’s analysis also lacked an element of proportional-
ity. The allegation of forgery should have been considered against the 
backdrop of an award-winning investigation that exposed the prime 
minister’s interference with BDBC operations, as well as a pattern of 
irregular loans, grants, and awards to businesses and individuals in the 
St-Maurice riding. McIntosh’s work fuelled debates in the House of 
Commons and the public domain, which led to important reforms.127 
Even before the Quebec sponsorship scandal, Shawinigate called 
attention to the need for monitoring, oversight, and reform on questions 
of ethics and conflict of interest in parliamentary and government affairs.  
Andrew McIntosh’s legacy is not that of a zealot reporter who mis-
placed his confidence in a rogue informant and brought the coercive 
power of the state down on himself and his newspaper. If the leaked 
document was authentic, the source was a whistle-blower who took 
significant risks in sharing important information about the prime 
minister. Had the reporter and his newspaper not taken the lead, the 
complex of events and transactions that constitute Shawinigate might not 
have been flushed out and brought to the public’s attention. This is 
precisely the kind of public interest newsgathering that should be 
protected by the courts.128  
On the other hand, granting a privilege in these circumstances might 
mean that a forgerer would go unpunished, with adverse implications for 
the prime minister’s reputation. Even then, the public interest in knowing 
of the circumstances surrounding the BDBC’s loan to the Auberge, not to 
mention the other details of Shawinigate, outpoints the interest in 
prosecuting the offender. From that perspective, there is no contest when 
an investigation into the use of public moneys to support a system of 
                                                                                                             
126  National Post – warrant review, supra, note 34, at para. 61. 
127  The BDBC’s rules were changed, and the government took steps to prevent ministers 
from using their influence with or seeking favours from Crown corporations: McIntosh Affidavit, 
supra, note 20, at paras. 239 and 241. 
128  “The remote possibility of resolving the debt forgery is far from sufficiently significant to 
outweigh the public benefit in protecting a thorough and responsible press”: National Post, supra, 
note 10, at para. 141 (per Abella J.). 
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patronage and favours is measured against the alleged commission of one 
offence.129  
Once the Court decided against McIntosh and the National Post on 
the question of privilege, there was little chance the orders would be 
found unreasonable under section 8 of the Charter.130 Still, the burden of 
proof could have made a difference in this case: whereas the would-be 
privilege holder must establish the claim under Wigmore’s four-step test, 
the burden is on the authorities to show grounds for a search warrant. 
This part of the case also brought the relationship between sections 2(b) 
and 8 into the forefront again. Several years earlier, the Court upheld 
search warrants against members of the press in Lessard and New 
Brunswick without finding a breach of section 2(b).131 In lieu of finding a 
violation in those cases, the Court prescribed additional section 8 criteria 
for searches against members of the press.132  
Unlike National Post, in which the target of the search was a confi-
dential source, Lessard and New Brunswick concerned police access to 
CBC video evidence, much of which had already been broadcast. 
Though it upheld the warrants, members of the Court took care to 
acknowledge the implications of these decisions for other newsgathering 
practices, such as reliance on confidential sources.133 Justice McLachlin, 
who was the only member of the Court to participate in the earlier cases 
and National Post, wrote vigorous dissents that explained why it was 
imperative to find a violation of section 2(b) when search warrants are 
ordered against the press.134 
                                                                                                             
129  The prime minister would not be without a remedy because he could sue in defamation 
for any actionable damage to his reputation. There, a journalist’s attempt to avoid liability by taking 
cover behind a confidential source would be less compelling. Jean Chrétien threatened litigation at 
one point but has not brought any proceedings in defamation against Andrew McIntosh or others 
who wrote and commented on Shawinigate. See Globe and Mail, supra, note 11, at para. 61. 
130  National Post, supra, note 10, at paras. 78-88 (dealing mainly, though not exclusively, 
with the requirement of notice to the media). 
131  Lessard, supra, note 49; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney 
General), [1991] S.C.J. No. 88, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 459 (S.C.C.).  
132  Lessard, id., at 445. 
133  Id., at 452 (per McLachlin J., explaining the ways — including consequences for confi-
dential sources — in which search warrants impinge on the underlying values of freedom of the 
press, and at 430 (per La Forest J., concurring, but voicing concerns about the implications for 
newsgathering and access to sources). 
134  Id., at 449 (stating that “[b]y specifically referring to freedom of the press, s. 2(b) affirms 
the special position of the press and media in our society” and adding that “[t]he history of freedom 
of the press in Canada belies the notion that the press can be treated like other citizens or legal 
entities when its activities come into conflict with the state”). 
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Though Lavallee was decided in the interim, National Post failed to 
reconsider the relationship between sections 2(b) and 8. Failing to do so 
underscored the double standard between journalist-source relations and 
the solicitor-client relationship which, as discussed above, has been 
singled out by the Court for special treatment. Though also a section 8 
search case, Lavallee found that section 488.1 of the Code violated 
section 7, and stated that the need for the full protection of the privilege 
is “activated” when the privilege holder — the solicitor’s client — is the 
target of a criminal investigation.135 Justice Arbour spoke for all mem-
bers of the Court in declaring that “any information acquired by the state 
without the consent of the privilege holder is information that the state is 
not entitled to as a rule of fundamental justice”.136 Despite Lavallee’s 
conclusion that the search violated section 7’s unenumerated principles 
of fundamental justice, the Court did not even discuss whether a search 
of the press violated section 2(b)’s express guarantee.137 Though the 
search in National Post was more intrusive, the McLachlin dissent in the 
earlier cases was all but forgotten, and the Chief Justice silently joined 
the majority opinion.138  
Otherwise, the Lessard criteria did little in National Post to provide 
meaningful protection for the press. Under Lessard’s mini-press doctrine, 
a warrant that does not violate section 2(b) must nonetheless comply 
with prescribed criteria. One of its nine elements states a requirement 
that there be “sufficient detail” to support a warrant where press 
freedom is at stake.139 A standard of vigilance was especially needed in 
National Post, given irregularities in the evidence, the history of 
Shawinigate, and the impact of the orders on confidential newsgather-
ing sources. Where circumstances called for a close and probing look at 
the evidence, the Court instead took the orders at face value and 
assumed that their purpose was to investigate a forgery, not to find and 
                                                                                                             
135  Lavallee, supra, note 85, at para. 23. 
136  Id., at para. 24. 
137  Despite recognizing that there was a “head-to-head clash between the government and the 
media”, which implicated the media’s s. 2(b) and s. 8 interests, the Court bypassed the s. 2(b) issue 
and went straight to the s. 8 criteria for reasonableness in a s. 2(b) context. National Post, supra, 
note 10, at paras. 78-79.  
138  Id. (citing McLachlin J.’s reasons in Lessard, without addressing the question of a s. 2(b) 
breach). 
139  Lessard, supra, note 49, at 445. 
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halt a whistle-blower.140 Despite recognizing the “special position” of 
the media141 the majority opinion was oblivious to the risk that the state 
might have exercised its coercive powers improperly, to expose a 
whistle-blower. Finally, the availability of alternative sources was 
another issue that was not adequately considered by Binnie J.’s majority 
opinion.142 Though it is an important factor in any decision, the search 
could still have been found unreasonable, even if the information was not 
available from other sources. 
A second, critical issue concerned the ex parte nature of the proceed-
ings and whether the targets of the orders should have received notice 
and granted a right to appear. Denying the reporter and newspaper status 
in the proceedings here — where the state sought access to a source who 
had revealed damaging information about the country’s highest elected 
officer and a Crown corporation — makes it difficult to imagine when 
the press would ever be entitled to procedural justice. Only LeBel J. and 
Abella J. found that McIntosh and the National Post should have had 
notice and an opportunity to appear at the warrant hearing.143 
The Court’s discussion of Wigmore balancing and the Lessard press 
doctrine shows how poorly the judges responded to the issues at stake in 
National Post. At the level of principle, the judges formed a line of 
resistance against a concept of newsgathering that would support and 
protect democratic values. That intransigence was reinforced by the 
Court’s disregard of the power dynamics at work in the search warrant 
contest, and of Shawinigate’s central contributions to values of transpar-
ency and accountability. 
Despite claiming that section 2(b)’s values would inform the balanc-
ing between confidentiality and disclosure, the Court took a negative 
                                                                                                             
140  Note that Binnie J. compared the circumstances of this case to those of O’Neill and Mil-
ler, supra, note 6. In discussing O’Neill, where an anonymous government source leaked false and 
damaging information about Maher Arar to a reporter, he commented, though O’Neill was not about 
whistle-blowing, that “[t]he alleged forgery is distinct from whistleblowing”; National Post, supra, 
note 10, at para. 62. Then he drew an analogy to Miller to explain that “a source who uses anonymity 
to put information into the public domain maliciously may not in the end avoid a measure of 
accountability”; id., at para. 69. 
141  Id., at paras. 30, 31 and 33. 
142  Lessard, supra, note 49, at 445 (stating that although it is not a constitutional require-
ment, the availability of alternative means is an important consideration in determining reasonable-
ness under s. 8). Though it was discussed obliquely, there was a difference of opinion on this issue in 
National Post; while Binnie J. stated that the document offered evidence that would not be available 
from any other source, Abella J. maintained that the police had not established the unavailability of 
alternative sources of evidence. National Post, supra, note 10, at paras. 21 and 149-151. 
143  Id., at paras. 94-97 (per LeBel J.) and 149-158 (per Abella J.). 
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view of McIntosh’s newsgathering practices and his handling of X. This 
led to a formalistic and uneven balancing of interests. By focusing on the 
possible commission of an offence, the Court discounted the public 
interest in the larger story of Shawinigate. From the outset, that story was 
grounded in McIntosh’s relationships with confidential sources, and the 
trust he carefully built in the course of investigative reporting that began 
in 1999 and continued through 2002. Not only did the orders against the 
reporter and newspaper place X at risk, they jeopardized McIntosh’s 
network of sources and the entire Shawinigate investigation.  
In the end, the salutary benefits of the search warrant and production 
order were open to question while the deleterious consequences, not only 
for McIntosh and his sources but for the practice of investigative report-
ing, were unquestionably serious.144 Contrary to the conclusion of the 
Court, the public did not have a strong interest in a clumsy investigation 
of a leaked document that might not have been forged, and in any case 
was unlikely to reveal the identity of the wrongdoer. By contrast, 
McIntosh would not have been able to tell the Shawinigate story without 
protecting his sources. It is clear, in such circumstances, that protecting 
those sources so that Shawinigate could be revealed was a higher priority 
than investigating the alleged forgery.  
III.  MACHOUETTE AND THE QUEBEC SPONSORSHIP SCANDAL 
Globe and Mail v. Canada was the other bookend in an extraordinary 
year at the Court for confidential newsgathering sources.145 There, the 
question of protecting a source arose from Daniel Leblanc’s investigative 
reporting on the Quebec sponsorship program. In this instance, the civil 
setting of this case generated a different dynamic and a more positive 
outcome for confidential newsgathering sources. By its own terms, 
National Post is limited to its particular circumstances, and the Court 
                                                                                                             
144  Id., at 142 (per Abella J., explaining how the investigation offered no more than “the 
slightest possible benefit to an investigation of an alleged forgery”, but would cause a “far weightier 
injury to the press interests at stake”, and concluding that “[t]he major demonstrable harm, with no 
countervailing benefit, is to the ability of the press to carry out its public mandate”). 
145  Globe and Mail, supra, note 11. The Court heard two appeals arising from these events at 
the same time; the second concerned a publication ban that was imposed on Leblanc and prohibited 
him from reporting “anything whatsoever” about the litigation (id., at para. 73), including settlement 
discussions between the federal government and Groupe Polygone.  
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confirmed that view of the forgery case in Globe and Mail.146 National 
Post stated its support for confidential newsgathering sources, in princi-
ple, but left it to Globe and Mail to propose source-protective criteria. 
That is why Globe and Mail will be the more influential of the two 
decisions, over time. 
By appearances, the sponsorship program, undertaken following 
Quebec’s near-miss sovereignty referendum in 1995, was a colossal 
misadventure. This regrettable narrative featured Liberal Party opera-
tives, the veneer of a government-sanctioned sponsorship program, and 
federal moneys flowing to Quebec businesses under a scheme involving 
fraud and kickbacks. These tawdry transactions led to a public process 
that culminated in the Gomery Report and several criminal prosecutions, 
after which the federal government commenced civil proceedings in 
Quebec to recover moneys paid for work that was not done.147 One of the 
defendants in this litigation was Groupe Polygone (“Polygone”), which 
raised a limitation claim that threatened Leblanc’s relationship with the 
confidential government source known as MaChouette.148 Though the 
issue arose through Polygone’s attempt to question government employ-
ees, the Globe sought a revocation order, and on cross-examination 
Leblanc refused to answer questions that might compromise MaChou-
ette. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the reporter was 
entitled to a testimonial privilege or immunity in these circumstances.149 
After rehearsing the Court’s earlier decision, including its rejection 
of a constitutional model, LeBel J.’s majority opinion reintroduced the 
constitutional considerations at stake and placed them in the forefront of 
his reasons. Not only did he refer to the constitutional status of news-
gathering several times, he incorporated Charter-like criteria into Globe 
and Mail’s standard to determine immunity for a confidential source.150 
                                                                                                             
146  Id., at para. 25 (confirming key differences between the cases to determine “how, and to 
what extent, the majority reasons in National Post are equally applicable” to the sponsorship appeal). 
147  Supra, note 3. 
148  Polygone sought to examine several federal employees in an attempt to learn when the 
federal government first became aware of problems with the sponsorship program. The govern-
ment’s action could be time-barred if Polygone could show when it first discovered those problems. 
149  The motion judge rejected the privilege and an unsuccessful appeal from that order led 
the Globe to seek a discontinuance of the revocation proceedings, which was also refused. It meant 
that Leblanc would have to testify, and the appeal came to the Supreme Court on that issue: Globe 
and Mail, supra, note 11, at paras. 8-9 (summarizing the proceedings on the privilege issue).  
150  Id., at paras. 28, 29, 31 and 48 (stating, in para. 28, that “[t]his is also an area of the law 
which is influenced by constitutional and quasi-constitutional instruments”; adding, in para. 29 that 
the Charter and Quebec Charter, infra, note 151 “protect several important rights that may be at 
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In spirit if not in form, the Court adopted a constitutional or near-
constitutional approach to confidential newsgathering sources.  
The case posed a delicate issue about the relationship between the 
common law and the law of Quebec, including the Quebec Charter of 
human rights and freedoms151 and the civil law. In addressing the status 
of Wigmore in Quebec, LeBel J. joined up the common law, police-
informer privilege, and the relationship between a journalist and her 
source.152 He invoked the example of an informer’s privilege to show 
that the common law is a vital part of Quebec law that does not threaten 
the civil law tradition.153 In addition, the analogy between informers and 
newsgathering sources further distinguished the sponsorship case from 
National Post and enabled LeBel J. to propose a more protective ap-
proach to journalist-source relations. 
While the police-informer relationship is protected as a class privi-
lege, the relationship between a journalist and her source is a case-by-
case privilege. Despite that difference between the two, LeBel J. equated 
the exclusionary rule for evidence protecting police informants with the 
issue that arises when journalists seek protection for confidential 
sources.154 In due course that brought him to the question of relevance 
and the role it plays as a check on fishing expeditions.155 There, LeBel J. 
found that the general rule that applies to litigation under the Quebec 
Civil Code applies equally to evidentiary privilege and the protection of 
confidential relationships.156  
                                                                                                             
stake in a claim of journalist-source privilege”; commenting, in para. 31, on the “complex 
environment” surrounding journalist-source privilege, including “[g]eneral principles and rules that 
belong to other areas of law, particularly constitutional law”; and declaring, in para. 48, that 
“constitutional rights under the Canadian Charter and quasi-constitutional rights under the Quebec 
Charter are engaged by a claim of journalist-source privilege”). 
151  R.S.Q. c. C-12 [hereinafter “Quebec Charter”]. 
152  The key decision on police-informer privilege is Bisaillon v. Keable, [1983] S.C.J. No. 
65, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 60 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bisaillon”], which held that the common law rule on 
this privilege applies in the province of Quebec. 
153  Globe and Mail, supra, note 11, at paras. 49-53 (explaining, by reference to Bisaillon, 
that there is a basis for applying the common law in Quebec to questions of journalist-source 
privilege). 
154  Id., at para. 51. 
155  Id., at para. 56. 
156  Id. (citing art. 2857 of the Civil Code, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, which states “[a]ll evidence of 
any fact relevant to a dispute is admissible …”, and adding that “if the party seeking disclosure of 
the identity of the source cannot establish that this fact is relevant, then there will be no need to go 
on to consider whether the privilege exists” (emphasis added)). Though he did not refer to them, the 
cases and rules that govern access to third party records, and the relevance threshold that applies in 
those circumstances, are clearly analogous; Mills, supra, note 64.  
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As noted above, National Post stoutly resisted the suggestion that the 
access-seeking party has any onus to justify the violation of a confiden-
tial relationship. In highlighting relevance and its gatekeeping role, 
Globe and Mail qualified that monolithic view of the burden; rather than 
change the law, LeBel J. simply emphasized that to be admissible, 
evidence must be relevant and that the burden to show relevance is on 
the party who places reliance on the evidence. Significantly, he treated 
this routine principle of civil litigation as a threshold and an important 
check on any unnecessary interference with the constitutional rights of 
the press.157 As he explained, this step “constitutes an added buffer 
against any unnecessary intrusion into aspects of the s. 2(b) newsgather-
ing rights of the press”.158 
Justice LeBel also discussed the criteria that must be addressed under 
Wigmore’s open-ended balancing where, as he put it, the “grunt work” is 
done.159 When disclosure is sought in the proceedings and whether the 
information is central to the dispute are important variables in determin-
ing the question of privilege. In functional terms, each criterion speaks to 
the relevance and necessity of the evidence in the truth-seeking process. 
As LeBel J. explained, disclosure will be less compelling when the 
information is not vital, either because it is not essential at a particular 
stage, or because it is not essential at all.160 He indicated that whether a 
journalist is a party to the litigation will also have a bearing on the 
question of confidentiality versus disclosure.161 
In addition, LeBel J. emphasized that evidence that is available by 
other means cannot be compelled by violating a confidential relationship. 
In his view, access to such information should only be granted when 
other means have been unsuccessfully attempted and exhausted. Once 
                                                                                                             
157  In this the analysis bears resemblance to the relevance threshold in the cases on third 
party production. Mills, id.; R. Pomerance, “Compelling the Message from the Medium: Media 
Search. Warrants, Subpoenas and Production Orders” (1997) 2 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 5, at 29 
(considering whether the Court’s decision in O’Connor might apply to questions of disclosure 
arising in the media). 
158  Globe and Mail, supra, note 11, at para. 56 (emphasis added). 
159  Id., at para. 57. 
160  Though the identity of a confidential source might be relevant under the broad definition 
of relevance in civil proceedings, “that fact may nevertheless be so peripheral to the actual legal and 
factual dispute between the parties that the journalist ought not to be required to disclose the source’s 
identity”. Id., at para. 60. 
161  When a journalist is a party to the litigation, the identity of the source may be a core 
issue; when she is a third party witness, it may be more difficult to establish that the journalist’s 
source is central to the dispute. 
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)  INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING 269 
 
again, he emphasized that the requirement of necessity acts as “a further 
buffer against fishing expeditions and any unnecessary interference with 
the work of the media”.162 By focusing on necessity and alternative 
means, he adopted criteria that are derived from the Dagenais/Mentuck 
test, and essentially finessed the Charter by adopting its criteria without 
creating a constitutional framework.163 Unlike National Post, which 
presented journalist-source privilege as an exception that was subject to 
an unremitting burden of proof, Globe and Mail proposed a standard that 
would ensure that “[r]equiring a journalist to breach a confidential 
undertaking with a source should only be done as a last resort”.164 The 
shift in approach from one case to the next could hardly have been more 
dramatic.  
The Court’s approach to the publication ban reinforced the protective 
tone of its discussion of confidential newsgathering sources. In the court 
below, the judge issued the order in a peremptory manner, though no 
request was made, evidence heard or submissions allowed.165 He was 
openly annoyed that Leblanc had published reports about confidential 
settlement negotiations between the parties that he had learned about 
from a confidential source.166 On its face the ban appeared impossible to 
justify under Dagenais/Mentuck, though the Court’s earlier decisions on 
bail hearing bans made its response in this case slightly more difficult to 
predict.167  
Justice LeBel strongly defended the reporter’s right to report confi-
dential settlement discussions, and was emphatic that Leblanc could 
publish any information he obtained by legal means. Initially, he found 
that the appeal should be allowed simply because the judge imposed the 
ban without hearing submissions from the parties.168 From there he went 
on to make revealing comments about Leblanc’s entitlement. Specifi-
cally, he held that Leblanc was free to use the information, even if his 
                                                                                                             
162  Id., at para. 63. 
163  Id., at paras. 62-65. 
164  Id., at para. 63 (emphasis added). 
165  Id., at para. 73.  
166  Id., at para. 73 (per de Grandpré J., stating that “[w]hat I don’t want to hear and what I 
don’t want to read in the newspapers is an article like the one that appeared in The Globe and Mail 
on October 21”). 
167  Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2010] S.C.J. No. 21, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 721 
(S.C.C.) (upholding the Criminal Code’s publication ban provision for bail hearings). 
168  Globe and Mail, supra, note 11, at para. 75 (stating that a ban, which “by its very nature 
infringes the constitutional rights of the party against whom it is imposed, cannot, absent extraordi-
nary circumstances not present here, be imposed ex proprio motu”). 
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source violated a legal obligation to his employer, because “there are 
sound policy reasons for not automatically subjecting journalists to the 
legal constraints and obligations imposed on their sources”.169 In lan-
guage that could readily apply to confidential newsgathering sources, he 
added that to bring “stories of broader public importance” to light, 
“sources willing to act as whistleblowers and bring these stories forward 
may often be required to breach legal obligations in the process”.170  
Justice LeBel went on to declare that the law cannot impose any ob-
ligation on a journalist “to act as a legal advisor to his or her sources of 
information”, as to do so would be a “dramatic interference with the 
work and operations of the news media”.171 Not only was this a key point 
in the context of the ban, the same reasoning can apply to the question of 
privilege; a journalist who can publish information that a source passed 
along in breach of a legal obligation should in principle also be able to 
protect that source’s confidentiality.  
Justice LeBel then gave the Dagenais/Mentuck test a complete air-
ing, and found the publication ban wanting at every stage. Of particular 
interest is the attention he gave to the ban’s deleterious consequences. In 
terms of the litigation, he remarked that “[t]here is clearly an overarching 
public interest in the outcome of this dispute” and stated that upholding 
the ban would “stifle the media’s exercise of their constitutionally 
mandated role”.172 That led him to return, in conclusion, to the issue of 
the source who acts illegally in revealing information to a member of the 
press, and to reiterate three key points: that journalists are not obligated 
to assess the legality of a source’s information; that such an obligation 
would invite considerable interference with the workings of the media; 
and that the source’s breach of duty is “often the only way that important 
stories, in the public interest, come to light”.173 Just as imposing a ban 
would be contrary to those interests, violating the relationship between a 
journalist and her source would undermine the same interests. 
To the extent National Post and Globe and Mail read as dissonant 
decisions, it is clear that the search warrant case is context-specific. That 
is why National Post should be interpreted, and read down, by the 
Court’s later decision in Globe and Mail. In the end, though the sponsor-
                                                                                                             
169  Id., at para. 85. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  Id., at para. 97. 
173  Id., at para. 98. 
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ship decision is more protective of confidential sources and of newsgath-
ering more generally, the question that remains is whether the common 
law adequately protects newsgathering and the core section 2(b) values at 
stake when investigative reporting relies on confidential sources.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
On journalist-source privilege, as on other issues affecting section 
2(b), the Court has spurned Charter solutions in favour of common law 
compromises that feature case-by-case decision-making.174 Under the 
terms of National Post and Globe and Mail, the law remains substantially 
the same, though section 2(b) values more overtly infuse the balancing 
under Wigmore’s fourth step. It is helpful that the decisions open up space 
for journalist-source privilege, and can be given an interpretation that 
affords confidential newsgathering sources a broader scope of protection. 
Still, it must be emphasized that the question is not simply whether 
confidentiality out-points the argument for disclosure in particular circum-
stances. Access to confidential sources, as a core element of newsgather-
ing, is threatened whenever legal process is invoked to compel disclosure. 
The relationship between a journalist and her source is systemic or 
institutional in nature, and that is why the analysis must transcend the 
details, even or especially where the source has committed a wrong in 
passing information along, as is invariably the case. 
The discussion has shown that the Wigmore test cannot adequately 
protect section 2(b)’s interests, and the net gains achieved by these 
decisions, while welcome, remain insufficient. As Binnie J. emphasized 
in National Post, the burden of proof throughout the four steps of the test 
remains on the party claiming the privilege. Though Globe and Mail’s 
focus on relevance served to ease the burden, it did not alter the Wigmore 
rule, which requires the privilege holder to prove that the confidential 
relationship should be protected. Contrary to the claim made in National 
Post, the burden of proof does determine the outcome, and it does matter 
whether the presumption is for or against the protection of confidential-
ity. On this point the Supreme Court acknowledged being out of step 
                                                                                                             
174  See, e.g., WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420 (S.C.C.) 
and Grant, supra, note 68 (rejecting Charter-based solutions in favour of incremental changes to the 
common law). 
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with other jurisdictions that require a breach of journalist-source confi-
dentiality to be justified.175  
Moreover, though Globe and Mail proposed source-protective fac-
tors, the balancing of interests under Wigmore’s fourth step remains 
open-ended. As such, it fails to set structured requirements that must be 
met before a confidential relationship can be violated. Hortatory appeals 
to section 2(b)’s values are no substitute for constitutionally inspired, 
bright line standards, and investigative reporting cannot be effectively 
conducted under the uncertainty of a regime that places confidentiality at 
the mercy of ad hoc, case-by-case decision-making. Wigmore provided a 
generic test that applies to various relationships, and neither incorporates 
nor reflects the values that define the role of a constitutionally protected 
free press in a democratic society. This standard was not designed to 
protect freedom of the press, and is not capable of doing so. 
In revealing the limits of judicial initiative and the common law’s 
capacity for reform, these decisions invite a broader process of debate. 
Leaks are commonplace and information is widely circulated under 
cover of anonymity. At the same time, the definitional boundaries of the 
press and media have all but evaporated and what newsgathering is, not 
to mention who is a journalist, have been thrown into doubt. In this 
setting it is not surprising that the Court sought refuge in an ad hoc, case-
driven response. From that perspective, National Post and Globe and 
Mail provide the impetus for a broader-based examination of who 
comprises the press, why its function is valued in democratic society, and 
how it should be protected by statute, the Charter and the common law.176  
                                                                                                             
175  National Post, supra, note 10, at para. 48. Wigmore’s apparatus of class and case-by-case 
privilege has no influence in the analysis of this question in the United States. There, the journalist-
source relationship is protected by 49 out of 50 states, as well as by the District of Columbia and 
federal common law. Though standards vary across jurisdictions, the burden to meet a standard of 
justification is routinely placed on the party seeking access to confidential, privileged information. In 
Commonwealth countries, statutory provisions create a prima facie privilege and place the onus of 
justification on those who seek access to confidential information. 
176  The follow-up to this article is a proposal for legislation that would define the privilege 
and the circumstances in which it would be protected from disclosure. Unlike a case-to-case 
approach, a statutory privilege can establish definitions to determine who can claim a privilege, 
when it can arise, whether there are exceptions and what they are, and what criteria should be 
applied to determine whether a promise of confidentiality will be protected or broken in particular 
instances.  
